Chapter Of the Advantages which Europe has derived From the Discovery of

PART III. Of the Advantages which Europe has derived From the Discovery of America, and from that of a Passage to the East Indies by the Cape of Good Hope.

  Such are the advantages which the colonies of America have derived from
  the policy of Europe.

  What are those which Europe has derived from the discovery and
  colonization of America?

  Those advantages may be divided, first, into the general advantages which
  Europe, considered as one great country, has derived from those great
  events; and, secondly, into the particular advantages which each
  colonizing country has derived from the colonies which particularly belong
  to it, in consequence of the authority or dominion which it exercises over
  them.

  The general advantages which Europe, considered as one great country, has
  derived from the discovery and colonization of America, consist, first, in
  the increase of its enjoyments; and, secondly, in the augmentation of its
  industry.

  The surplus produce of America imported into Europe, furnishes the
  inhabitants of this great continent with a variety of commodities which
  they could not otherwise have possessed; some for conveniency and use,
  some for pleasure, and some for ornament; and thereby contributes to
  increase their enjoyments.

  The discovery and colonization of America, it will readily be allowed,
  have contributed to augment the industry, first, of all the countries
  which trade to it directly, such as Spain, Portugal, France, and England;
  and, secondly, of all those which, without trading to it directly, send,
  through the medium of other countries, goods to it of their own produce,
  such as Austrian Flanders, and some provinces of Germany, which, through
  the medium of the countries before mentioned, send to it a considerable
  quantity of linen and other goods. All such countries have evidently
  gained a more extensive market for their surplus produce, and must
  consequently have been encouraged to increase its quantity.

  But that those great events should likewise have contributed to encourage
  the industry of countries such as Hungary and Poland, which may never,
  perhaps, have sent a single commodity of their own produce to America, is
  not, perhaps, altogether so evident. That those events have done so,
  however, cannot be doubted. Some part of the produce of America is
  consumed in Hungary and Poland, and there is some demand there for the
  sugar, chocolate, and tobacco, of that new quarter of the world. But those
  commodities must be purchased with something which is either the produce
  of the industry of Hungary and Poland, or with something which had been
  purchased with some part of that produce. Those commodities of America are
  new values, new equivalents, introduced into Hungary and Poland, to be
  exchanged there for the surplus produce of these countries. By being
  carried thither, they create a new and more extensive market for that
  surplus produce. They raise its value, and thereby contribute to encourage
  its increase. Though no part of it may ever be carried to America, it may
  be carried to other countries, which purchase it with a part of their
  share of the surplus produce of America, and it may find a market by means
  of the circulation of that trade which was originally put into motion by
  the surplus produce of America.

  Those great events may even have contributed to increase the enjoyments,
  and to augment the industry, of countries which not only never sent any
  commodities to America, but never received any from it. Even such
  countries may have received a greater abundance of other commodities from
  countries, of which the surplus produce had been augmented by means of the
  American trade. This greater abundance, as it must necessarily have
  increased their enjoyments, so it must likewise have augmented their
  industry. A greater number of new equivalents, of some kind or other, must
  have been presented to them to be exchanged for the surplus produce of
  that industry. A more extensive market must have been created for that
  surplus produce, so as to raise its value, and thereby encourage its
  increase. The mass of commodities annually thrown into the great circle of
  European commerce, and by its various revolutions annually distributed
  among all the different nations comprehended within it, must have been
  augmented by the whole surplus produce of America. A greater share of this
  greater mass, therefore, is likely to have fallen to each of those
  nations, to have increased their enjoyments, and augmented their industry.

  The exclusive trade of the mother countries tends to diminish, or at least
  to keep down below what they would otherwise rise to, both the enjoyments
  and industry of all those nations in general, and of the American colonies
  in particular. It is a dead weight upon the action of one of the great
  springs which puts into motion a great part of the business of mankind. By
  rendering the colony produce dearer in all other countries, it lessens its
  consumption, and thereby cramps the industry of the colonies, and both the
  enjoyments and the industry of all other countries, which both enjoy less
  when they pay more for what they enjoy, and produce less when they get
  less for what they produce. By rendering the produce of all other
  countries dearer in the colonies, it cramps in the same manner the
  industry of all other colonies, and both the enjoyments and the industry
  of the colonies. It is a clog which, for the supposed benefit of some
  particular countries, embarrasses the pleasures and encumbers the industry
  of all other countries, but of the colonies more than of any other. It not
  only excludes as much as possible all other countries from one particular
  market, but it confines as much as possible the colonies to one particular
  market; and the difference is very great between being excluded from one
  particular market when all others are open, and being confined to one
  particular market when all others are shut up. The surplus produce of the
  colonies, however, is the original source of all that increase of
  enjoyments and industry which Europe derives from the discovery and
  colonization of America, and the exclusive trade of the mother countries
  tends to render this source much less abundant than it otherwise would be.

  The particular advantages which each colonizing country derives from the
  colonies which particularly belong to it, are of two different kinds;
  first, those common advantages which every empire derives from the
  provinces subject to its dominion; and, secondly, those peculiar
  advantages which are supposed to result from provinces of so very peculiar
  a nature as the European colonies of America.

  The common advantages which every empire derives from the provinces
  subject to its dominion consist, first, in the military force which they
  furnish for its defence; and, secondly, in the revenue which they furnish
  for the support of its civil government. The Roman colonies furnished
  occasionally both the one and the other. The Greek colonies sometimes
  furnished a military force, but seldom any revenue. They seldom
  acknowledged themselves subject to the dominion of the mother city. They
  were generally her allies in war, but very seldom her subjects in peace.

  The European colonies of America have never yet furnished any military
  force for the defence of the mother country. The military force has never
  yet been sufficient for their own defence; and in the different wars in
  which the mother countries have been engaged, the defence of their
  colonies has generally occasioned a very considerable distraction of the
  military force of those countries. In this respect, therefore, all the
  European colonies have, without exception, been a cause rather of weakness
  than of strength to their respective mother countries.

  The colonies of Spain and Portugal only have contributed any revenue
  towards the defence of the mother country, or the support of her civil
  government. The taxes which have been levied upon those of other European
  nations, upon those of England in particular, have seldom been equal to
  the expense laid out upon them in time of peace, and never sufficient to
  defray that which they occasioned in time of war. Such colonies,
  therefore, have been a source of expense, and not of revenue, to their
  respective mother countries.

  The advantages of such colonies to their respective mother countries,
  consist altogether in those peculiar advantages which are supposed to
  result from provinces of so very peculiar a nature as the European
  colonies of America; and the exclusive trade, it is acknowledged, is the
  sole source of all those peculiar advantages.

  In consequence of this exclusive trade, all that part of the surplus
  produce of the English colonies, for example, which consists in what are
  called enumerated commodities, can be sent to no other country but
  England. Other countries must afterwards buy it of her. It must be
  cheaper, therefore, in England than it can be in any other country, and
  must contribute more to increase the enjoyments of England than those of
  any other country. It must likewise contribute more to encourage her
  industry. For all those parts of her own surplus produce which England
  exchanges for those enumerated commodities, she must get a better price
  than any other countries can get for the like parts of theirs, when they
  exchange them for the same commodities. The manufactures of England, for
  example, will purchase a greater quantity of the sugar and tobacco of her
  own colonies than the like manufactures of other countries can purchase of
  that sugar and tobacco. So far, therefore, as the manufactures of England
  and those of other countries are both to be exchanged for the sugar and
  tobacco of the English colonies, this superiority of price gives an
  encouragement to the former beyond what the latter can, in these
  circumstances, enjoy. The exclusive trade of the colonies, therefore, as
  it diminishes, or at least keeps down below what they would otherwise rise
  to, both the enjoyments and the industry of the countries which do not
  possess it, so it gives an evident advantage to the countries which do
  possess it over those other countries.

  This advantage, however, will, perhaps, be found to be rather what may be
  called a relative than an absolute advantage, and to give a superiority to
  the country which enjoys it, rather by depressing the industry and produce
  of other countries, than by raising those of that particular country above
  what they would naturally rise to in the case of a free trade.

  The tobacco of Maryland and Virginia, for example, by means of the
  monopoly which England enjoys of it, certainly comes cheaper to England
  than it can do to France to whom England commonly sells a considerable
  part of it. But had France and all other European countries been at all
  times allowed a free trade to Maryland and Virginia, the tobacco of those
  colonies might by this time have come cheaper than it actually does, not
  only to all those other countries, but likewise to England. The produce of
  tobacco, in consequence of a market so much more extensive than any which
  it has hitherto enjoyed, might, and probably would, by this time have been
  so much increased as to reduce the profits of a tobacco plantation to
  their natural level with those of a corn plantation, which it is supposed
  they are still somewhat above. The price of tobacco might, and probably
  would, by this time have fallen somewhat lower than it is at present. An
  equal quantity of the commodities, either of England or of those other
  countries, might have purchased in Maryland and Virginia a greater
  quantity of tobacco than it can do at present, and consequently have been
  sold there for so much a better price. So far as that weed, therefore,
  can, by its cheapness and abundance, increase the enjoyments, or augment
  the industry, either of England or of any other country, it would
  probably, in the case of a free trade, have produced both these effects in
  somewhat a greater degree than it can do at present. England, indeed,
  would not, in this case, have had any advantage over other countries. She
  might have bought the tobacco of her colonies somewhat cheaper, and
  consequently have sold some of her own commodities somewhat dearer, than
  she actually does; but she could neither have bought the one cheaper, nor
  sold the other dearer, than any other country might have done. She might,
  perhaps, have gained an absolute, but she would certainly have lost a
  relative advantage.

  In order, however, to obtain this relative advantage in the colony trade,
  in order to execute the invidious and malignant project of excluding, as
  much as possible, other nations from any share in it, England, there are
  very probable reasons for believing, has not only sacrificed a part of the
  absolute advantage which she, as well as every other nation, might have
  derived from that trade, but has subjected herself both to an absolute and
  to a relative disadvantage in almost every other branch of trade.

  When, by the act of navigation, England assumed to herself the monopoly of
  the colony trade, the foreign capitals which had before been employed in
  it, were necessarily withdrawn from it. The English capital, which had
  before carried on but a part of it, was now to carry on the whole. The
  capital which had before supplied the colonies with but a part of the
  goods which they wanted from Europe, was now all that was employed to
  supply them with the whole. But it could not supply them with the whole;
  and the goods with which it did supply them were necessarily sold very
  dear. The capital which had before bought but a part of the surplus
  produce of the colonies, was now all that was employed to buy the whole.
  But it could not buy the whole at any thing near the old price; and
  therefore, whatever it did buy, it necessarily bought very cheap. But in
  an employment of capital, in which the merchant sold very dear, and bought
  very cheap, the profit must have been very great, and much above the
  ordinary level of profit in other branches of trade. This superiority of
  profit in the colony trade could not fail to draw from other branches of
  trade a part of the capital which had before been employed in them. But
  this revulsion of capital, as it must have gradually increased the
  competition of capitals in the colony trade, so it must have gradually
  diminished that competition in all those other branches of trade; as it
  must have gradually lowered the profits of the one, so it must have
  gradually raised those of the other, till the profits of all came to a new
  level, different from, and somewhat higher, than that at which they had
  been before.

  This double effect of drawing capital from all other trades, and of
  raising the rate of profit somewhat higher than it otherwise would have
  been in all trades, was not only produced by this monopoly upon its first
  establishment, but has continued to be produced by it ever since.

  First, This monopoly has been continually drawing capital from all other
  trades, to be employed in that of the colonies.

  Though the wealth of Great Britain has increased very much since the
  establishment of the act of navigation, it certainly has not increased in
  the same proportion as that or the colonies. But the foreign trade of
  every country naturally increases in proportion to its wealth, its surplus
  produce in proportion to its whole produce; and Great Britain having
  engrossed to herself almost the whole of what may be called the foreign
  trade of the colonies, and her capital not having increased in the same
  proportion as the extent of that trade, she could not carry it on without
  continually withdrawing from other branches of trade some part of the
  capital which had before been employed in them, as well as withholding
  from them a great deal more which would otherwise have gone to them. Since
  the establishment of the act of navigation, accordingly, the colony trade
  has been continually increasing, while many other branches of foreign
  trade, particularly of that to other parts of Europe, have been
  continually decaying. Our manufactures for foreign sale, instead of being
  suited, as before the act of navigation, to the neighbouring market of
  Europe, or to the more distant one of the countries which lie round the
  Mediterranean sea, have the greater part of them, been accommodated to the
  still more distant one of the colonies; to the market in which they have
  the monopoly, rather than to that in which they have many competitors. The
  causes of decay in other branches of foreign trade, which, by Sir Matthew
  Decker and other writers, have been sought for in the excess and improper
  mode of taxation, in the high price of labour, in the increase of luxury,
  etc. may all be found in the overgrowth of the colony trade. The
  mercantile capital of Great Britain, though very great, yet not being
  infinite, and though greatly increased since the act of navigation, yet
  not being increased in the same proportion as the colony trade, that trade
  could not possibly be carried on without withdrawing some part of that
  capital from other branches of trade, nor consequently without some decay
  of those other branches.

  England, it must be observed, was a great trading country, her mercantile
  capital was very great, and likely to become still greater and greater
  every day, not only before the act of navigation had established the
  monopoly of the corn trade, but before that trade was very considerable.
  In the Dutch war, during the government of Cromwell, her navy was superior
  to that of Holland; and in that which broke out in the beginning of the
  reign of Charles II., it was at least equal, perhaps superior to the
  united navies of France and Holland. Its superiority, perhaps, would
  scarce appear greater in the present times, at least if the Dutch navy
  were to bear the same proportion to the Dutch commerce now which it did
  then. But this great naval power could not, in either of those wars, be
  owing to the act of navigation. During the first of them, the plan of that
  act had been but just formed; and though, before the breaking out of the
  second, it had been fully enacted by legal authority, yet no part of it
  could have had time to produce any considerable effect, and least of all
  that part which established the exclusive trade to the colonies. Both the
  colonies and their trade were inconsiderable then, in comparison of what
  they are how. The island of Jamaica was an unwholesome desert, little
  inhabited, and less cultivated. New York and New Jersey were in the
  possession of the Dutch, the half of St. Christopher’s in that of the
  French. The island of Antigua, the two Carolinas, Pennsylvania, Georgia,
  and Nova Scotia, were not planted. Virginia, Maryland, and New England
  were planted; and though they were very thriving colonies, yet there was
  not perhaps at that time, either in Europe or America, a single person who
  foresaw, or even suspected, the rapid progress which they have since made
  in wealth, population, and improvement. The island of Barbadoes, in short,
  was the only British colony of any consequence, of which the condition at
  that time bore any resemblance to what it is at present. The trade of the
  colonies, of which England, even for some time after the act of
  navigation, enjoyed but a part (for the act of navigation was not very
  strictly executed till several years after it was enacted), could not at
  that time be the cause of the great trade of England, nor of the great
  naval power which was supported by that trade. The trade which at that
  time supported that great naval power was the trade of Europe, and of the
  countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea. But the share which Great
  Britain at present enjoys of that trade could not support any such great
  naval power. Had the growing trade of the colonies been left free to all
  nations, whatever share of it might have fallen to Great Britain, and a
  very considerable share would probably have fallen to her, must have been
  all an addition to this great trade of which she was before in possession.
  In consequence of the monopoly, the increase of the colony trade has not
  so much occasioned an addition to the trade which Great Britain had
  before, as a total change in its direction.

  Secondly, This monopoly has necessarily contributed to keep up the rate of
  profit, in all the different branches of British trade, higher than it
  naturally would have been, had all nations been allowed a free trade to
  the British colonies.

  The monopoly of the colony trade, as it necessarily drew towards that
  trade a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would
  have gone to it of its own accord, so, by the expulsion of all foreign
  capitals, it necessarily reduced the whole quantity of capital employed in
  that trade below what it naturally would have been in the case of a free
  trade. But, by lessening the competition of capitals in that branch of
  trade, it necessarily raised the rate of profit in that branch. By
  lessening, too, the competition of British capitals in all other branches
  of trade, it necessarily raised the rate of British profit in all those
  other branches. Whatever may have been, at any particular period since the
  establishment of the act of navigation, the state or extent of the
  mercantile capital of Great Britain, the monopoly of the colony trade
  must, during the continuance of that state, have raised the ordinary rate
  of British profit higher than it otherwise would have been, both in that
  and in all the other branches of British trade. If, since the
  establishment of the act of navigation, the ordinary rate of British
  profit has fallen considerably, as it certainly has, it must have fallen
  still lower, had not the monopoly established by that act contributed to
  keep it up.

  But whatever raises, in any country, the ordinary rate of profit higher
  than it otherwise would be, necessarily subjects that country both to an
  absolute, and to a relative disadvantage in every branch of trade of which
  she has not the monopoly.

  It subjects her to an absolute disadvantage; because, in such branches of
  trade, her merchants cannot get this greater profit without selling dearer
  than they otherwise would do, both the goods of foreign countries which
  they import into their own, and the goods of their own country which they
  export to foreign countries. Their own country must both buy dearer and
  sell dearer; must both buy less, and sell less; must both enjoy less and
  produce less, than she otherwise would do.

  It subjects her to a relative disadvantage; because, in such branches of
  trade, it sets other countries, which are not subject to the same absolute
  disadvantage, either more above her or less below her, than they otherwise
  would be. It enables them both to enjoy more and to produce more, in
  proportion to what she enjoys and produces. It renders their superiority
  greater, or their inferiority less, than it otherwise would be. By raising
  the price of her produce above what it otherwise would be, it enables the
  merchants of other countries to undersell her in foreign markets, and
  thereby to justle her out of almost all those branches of trade, of which
  she has not the monopoly.

  Our merchants frequently complain of the high wages of British labour, as
  the cause of their manufactures being undersold in foreign markets; but
  they are silent about the high profits of stock. They complain of the
  extravagant gain of other people; but they say nothing of their own. The
  high profits of British stock, however, may contribute towards raising the
  price of British manufactures, in many cases, as much, and in some perhaps
  more, than the high wages of British labour.

  It is in this manner that the capital of Great Britain, one may justly
  say, has partly been drawn and partly been driven from the greater part of
  the different branches of trade of which she has not the monopoly; from
  the trade of Europe, in particular, and from that of the countries which
  lie round the Mediterranean sea.

  It has partly been drawn from those branches of trade, by the attraction
  of superior profit in the colony trade, in consequence of the continual
  increase of that trade, and of the continual insufficiency of the capital
  which had carried it on one year to carry it on the next.

  It has partly been driven from them, by the advantage which the high rate
  of profit established in Great Britain gives to other countries, in all
  the different branches of trade of which Great Britain has not the
  monopoly.

  As the monopoly of the colony trade has drawn from those other branches a
  part of the British capital, which would otherwise have been employed in
  them, so it has forced into them many foreign capitals which would never
  have gone to them, had they not been expelled from the colony trade. In
  those other branches of trade, it has diminished the competition of
  British capitals, and thereby raised the rate of British profit higher
  than it otherwise would have been. On the contrary, it has increased the
  competition of foreign capitals, and thereby sunk the rate of foreign
  profit lower than it otherwise would have been. Both in the one way and in
  the other, it must evidently have subjected Great Britain to a relative
  disadvantage in all those other branches of trade.

  The colony trade, however, it may perhaps be said, is more advantageous to
  Great Britain than any other; and the monopoly, by forcing into that trade
  a greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would
  otherwise have gone to it, has turned that capital into an employment,
  more advantageous to the country than any other which it could have found.

  The most advantageous employment of any capital to the country to which it
  belongs, is that which maintains there the greatest quantity of productive
  labour, and increases the most the annual produce of the land and labour
  of that country. But the quantity of productive labour which any capital
  employed in the foreign trade of consumption can maintain, is exactly in
  proportion, it has been shown in the second book, to the frequency of its
  returns. A capital of a thousand pounds, for example, employed in a
  foreign trade of consumption, of which the returns are made regularly once
  in the year, can keep in constant employment, in the country to which it
  belongs, a quantity of productive labour, equal to what a thousand pounds
  can maintain there for a year. If the returns are made twice or thrice in
  the year, it can keep in constant employment a quantity of productive
  labour, equal to what two or three thousand pounds can maintain there for
  a year. A foreign trade of consumption carried on with a neighbouring, is,
  upon that account, in general, more advantageous than one carried on with
  a distant country; and, for the same reason, a direct foreign trade of
  consumption, as it has likewise been shown in the second book, is in
  general more advantageous than a round-about one.

  But the monopoly of the colony trade, so far as it has operated upon the
  employment of the capital of Great Britain, has, in all cases, forced some
  part of it from a foreign trade of consumption carried on with a
  neighbouring, to one carried on with a more distant country, and in many
  cases from a direct foreign trade of consumption to a round-about one.

  First, The monopoly of the colony trade has, in all cases, forced some
  part of the capital of Great Britain from a foreign trade of consumption
  carried on with a neighbouring, to one carried on with a more distant
  country.

  It has, in all cases, forced some part of that capital from the trade with
  Europe, and with the countries which lie round the Mediterranean sea, to
  that with the more distant regions of America and the West Indies; from
  which the returns are necessarily less frequent, not only on account of
  the greater distance, but on account of the peculiar circumstances of
  those countries. New colonies, it has already been observed, are always
  understocked. Their capital is always much less than what they could
  employ with great profit and advantage in the improvement and cultivation
  of their land. They have a constant demand, therefore, for more capital
  than they have of their own; and, in order to supply the deficiency of
  their own, they endeavour to borrow as much as they can of the mother
  country, to whom they are, therefore, always in debt. The most common way
  in which the colonies contract this debt, is not by borrowing upon bond of
  the rich people of the mother country, though they sometimes do this too,
  but by running as much in arrear to their correspondents, who supply them
  with goods from Europe, as those correspondents will allow them. Their
  annual returns frequently do not amount to more than a third, and
  sometimes not to so great a proportion of what they owe. The whole
  capital, therefore, which their correspondents advance to them, is seldom
  returned to Britain in less than three, and sometimes not in less than
  four or five years. But a British capital of a thousand pounds, for
  example, which is returned to Great Britain only once in five years, can
  keep in constant employment only one-fifth part of the British industry
  which it could maintain, if the whole was returned once in the year; and,
  instead of the quantity of industry which a thousand pounds could maintain
  for a year, can keep in constant employment the quantity only which two
  hundred pounds can maintain for a year. The planter, no doubt, by the high
  price which he pays for the goods from Europe, by the interest upon the
  bills which he grants at distant dates, and by the commission upon the
  renewal of those which he grants at near dates, makes up, and probably
  more than makes up, all the loss which his correspondent can sustain by
  this delay. But, though he make up the loss of his correspondent, he
  cannot make up that of Great Britain. In a trade of which the returns are
  very distant, the profit of the merchant may be as great or greater than
  in one in which they are very frequent and near; but the advantage of the
  country in which he resides, the quantity of productive labour constantly
  maintained there, the annual produce of the land and labour, must always
  be much less. That the returns of the trade to America, and still more
  those of that to the West Indies, are, in general, not only more distant,
  but more irregular and more uncertain, too, than those of the trade to any
  part of Europe, or even of the countries which lie round the Mediterranean
  sea, will readily be allowed, I imagine, by everybody who has any
  experience of those different branches of trade.

  Secondly, The monopoly of the colony trade, has, in many cases, forced
  some part of the capital of Great Britain from a direct foreign trade of
  consumption, into a round-about one.

  Among the enumerated commodities which can be sent to no other market but
  Great Britain, there are several of which the quantity exceeds very much
  the consumption of Great Britain, and of which, a part, therefore, must be
  exported to other countries. But this cannot be done without forcing some
  part of the capital of Great Britain into a round-about foreign trade of
  consumption. Maryland, and Virginia, for example, send annually to Great
  Britain upwards of ninety-six thousand hogsheads of tobacco, and the
  consumption of Great Britain is said not to exceed fourteen thousand.
  Upwards of eighty-two thousand hogsheads, therefore, must be exported to
  other countries, to France, to Holland, and, to the countries which lie
  round the Baltic and Mediterranean seas. But that part of the capital of
  Great Britain which brings those eighty-two thousand hogsheads to Great
  Britain, which re-exports them from thence to those other countries, and
  which brings back from those other countries to Great Britain either goods
  or money in return, is employed in a round-about foreign trade of
  consumption; and is necessarily forced into this employment, in order to
  dispose of this great surplus. If we would compute in how many years the
  whole of this capital is likely to come back to Great Britain, we must add
  to the distance of the American returns that of the returns from those
  other countries. If, in the direct foreign trade of consumption which we
  carry on with America, the whole capital employed frequently does not come
  back in less than three or four years, the whole capital employed in this
  round-about one is not likely to come back in less than four or five. If
  the one can keep in constant employment but a third or a fourth part of
  the domestic industry which could be maintained by a capital returned once
  in the year, the other can keep in constant employment but a fourth or a
  fifth part of that industry. At some of the outports a credit is commonly
  given to those foreign correspondents to whom they export them tobacco. At
  the port of London, indeed, it is commonly sold for ready money: the rule
  is Weigh and pay. At the port of London, therefore, the final returns of
  the whole round-about trade are more distant than the returns from
  America, by the time only which the goods may lie unsold in the warehouse;
  where, however, they may sometimes lie long enough. But, had not the
  colonies been confined to the market of Great Britain for the sale of
  their tobacco, very little more of it would probably have come to us than
  what was necessary for the home consumption. The goods which Great Britain
  purchases at present for her own consumption with the great surplus of
  tobacco which she exports to other countries, she would, in this case,
  probably have purchased with the immediate produce of her own industry, or
  with some part of her own manufactures. That produce, those manufactures,
  instead of being almost entirely suited to one great market, as at
  present, would probably have been fitted to a great number of smaller
  markets. Instead of one great round-about foreign trade of consumption,
  Great Britain would probably have carried on a great number of small
  direct foreign trades of the same kind. On account of the frequency of the
  returns, a part, and probably but a small part, perhaps not above a third
  or a fourth of the capital which at present carries on this great
  round-about trade, might have been sufficient to carry on all those small
  direct ones; might have kept in constant employment an equal quantity of
  British industry; and have equally supported the annual produce of the
  land and labour of Great Britain. All the purposes of this trade being, in
  this manner, answered by a much smaller capital, there would have been a
  large spare capital to apply to other purposes; to improve the lands, to
  increase the manufactures, and to extend the commerce of Great Britain; to
  come into competition at least with the other British capitals employed in
  all those different ways, to reduce the rate of profit in them all, and
  thereby to give to Great Britain, in all of them, a superiority over other
  countries, still greater than what she at present enjoys.

  The monopoly of the colony trade, too, has forced some part of the capital
  of Great Britain from all foreign trade of consumption to a carrying
  trade; and, consequently from supporting more or less the industry of
  Great Britain, to be employed altogether in supporting partly that of the
  colonies, and partly that of some other countries.

  The goods, for example, which are annually purchased with the great
  surplus of eighty-two thousand hogsheads of tobacco annually re-exported
  from Great Britain, are not all consumed in Great Britain. Part of them,
  linen from Germany and Holland, for example, is returned to the colonies
  for their particular consumption. But that part of the capital of Great
  Britain which buys the tobacco with which this linen is afterwards bought,
  is necessarily withdrawn from supporting the industry of Great Britain, to
  be employed altogether in supporting, partly that of the colonies, and
  partly that of the particular countries who pay for this tobacco with the
  produce of their own industry.

  The monopoly of the colony trade, besides, by forcing towards it a much
  greater proportion of the capital of Great Britain than what would
  naturally have gone to it, seems to have broken altogether that natural
  balance which would otherwise have taken place among all the different
  branches of British industry. The industry of Great Britain, instead of
  being accommodated to a great number of small markets, has been
  principally suited to one great market. Her commerce, instead of running
  in a great number of small channels, has been taught to run principally in
  one great channel. But the whole system of her industry and commerce has
  thereby been rendered less secure; the whole state of her body politic
  less healthful than it otherwise would have been. In her present
  condition, Great Britain resembles one of those unwholesome bodies in
  which some of the vital parts are overgrown, and which, upon that account,
  are liable to many dangerous disorders, scarce incident to those in which
  all the parts are more properly proportioned. A small stop in that great
  blood-vessel, which has been artificially swelled beyond its natural
  dimensions, and through which an unnatural proportion of the industry and
  commerce of the country has been forced to circulate, is very likely to
  bring on the most dangerous disorders upon the whole body politic. The
  expectation of a rupture with the colonies, accordingly, has struck the
  people of Great Britain with more terror than they ever felt for a Spanish
  armada, or a French invasion. It was this terror, whether well or ill
  grounded, which rendered the repeal of the stamp act, among the merchants
  at least, a popular measure. In the total exclusion from the colony
  market, was it to last only for a few years, the greater part of our
  merchants used to fancy that they foresaw an entire stop to their trade;
  the greater part of our master manufacturers, the entire ruin of their
  business; and the greater part of our workmen, an end of their employment.
  A rupture with any of our neighbours upon the continent, though likely,
  too, to occasion some stop or interruption in the employments of some of
  all these different orders of people, is foreseen, however, without any
  such general emotion. The blood, of which the circulation is stopt in some
  of the smaller vessels, easily disgorges itself into the greater, without
  occasioning any dangerous disorder; but, when it is stopt in any of the
  greater vessels, convulsions, apoplexy, or death, are the immediate and
  unavoidable consequences. If but one of those overgrown manufactures,
  which, by means either of bounties or of the monopoly of the home and
  colony markets, have been artificially raised up to any unnatural height,
  finds some small stop or interruption in its employment, it frequently
  occasions a mutiny and disorder alarming to government, and embarrassing
  even to the deliberations of the legislature. How great, therefore, would
  be the disorder and confusion, it was thought, which must necessarily be
  occasioned by a sudden and entire stop in the employment of so great a
  proportion of our principal manufacturers?

  Some moderate and gradual relaxation of the laws which give to Great
  Britain the exclusive trade to the colonies, till it is rendered in a
  great measure free, seems to be the only expedient which can, in all
  future times, deliver her from this danger; which can enable her, or even
  force her, to withdraw some part of her capital from this overgrown
  employment, and to turn it, though with less profit, towards other
  employments; and which, by gradually diminishing one branch of her
  industry, and gradually increasing all the rest, can, by degrees, restore
  all the different branches of it to that natural, healthful, and proper
  proportion, which perfect liberty necessarily establishes, and which
  perfect liberty can alone preserve. To open the colony trade all at once
  to all nations, might not only occasion some transitory inconveniency, but
  a great permanent loss, to the greater part of those whose industry or
  capital is at present engaged in it. The sudden loss of the employment,
  even of the ships which import the eighty-two thousand hogsheads of
  tobacco, which are over and above the consumption of Great Britain, might
  alone be felt very sensibly. Such are the unfortunate effects of all the
  regulations of the mercantile system. They not only introduce very
  dangerous disorders into the state of the body politic, but disorders
  which it is often difficult to remedy, without occasioning, for a time at
  least, still greater disorders. In what manner, therefore, the colony
  trade ought gradually to be opened; what are the restraints which ought
  first, and what are those which ought last, to be taken away; or in what
  manner the natural system of perfect liberty and justice ought gradually
  to be restored, we must leave to the wisdom of future statesmen and
  legislators to determine.

  Five different events, unforeseen and unthought of, have very fortunately
  concurred to hinder Great Britain from feeling, so sensibly as it was
  generally expected she would, the total exclusion which has now taken
  place for more than a year (from the first of December 1774) from a very
  important branch of the colony trade, that of the twelve associated
  provinces of North America. First, those colonies, in preparing themselves

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