Chapter Of the Expense of Defence.

PART I. Of the Expense of Defence.

  The first duty of the sovereign, that of protecting the society from the
  violence and invasion of other independent societies, can be performed
  only by means of a military force. But the expense both of preparing this
  military force in time of peace, and of employing it in time of war, is
  very different in the different states of society, in the different
  periods of improvement.

  Among nations of hunters, the lowest and rudest state of society, such as
  we find it among the native tribes of North America, every man is a
  warrior, as well as a hunter. When he goes to war, either to defend his
  society, or to revenge the injuries which have been done to it by other
  societies, he maintains himself by his own labour, in the same manner as
  when he lives at home. His society (for in this state of things there is
  properly neither sovereign nor commonwealth) is at no sort of expense,
  either to prepare him for the field, or to maintain him while he is in it.

  Among nations of shepherds, a more advanced state of society, such as we
  find it among the Tartars and Arabs, every man is, in the same manner, a
  warrior. Such nations have commonly no fixed habitation, but live either
  in tents, or in a sort of covered waggons, which are easily transported
  from place to place. The whole tribe, or nation, changes its situation
  according to the different seasons of the year, as well as according to
  other accidents. When its herds and flocks have consumed the forage of one
  part of the country, it removes to another, and from that to a third. In
  the dry season, it comes down to the banks of the rivers; in the wet
  season, it retires to the upper country. When such a nation goes to war,
  the warriors will not trust their herds and flocks to the feeble defence
  of their old men, their women and children; and their old men, their women
  and children, will not be left behind without defence, and without
  subsistence. The whole nation, besides, being accustomed to a wandering
  life, even in time of peace, easily takes the field in time of war.
  Whether it marches as an army, or moves about as a company of herdsmen,
  the way of life is nearly the same, though the object proposed by it be
  very different. They all go to war together, therefore, and everyone does
  as well as he can. Among the Tartars, even the women have been frequently
  known to engage in battle. If they conquer, whatever belongs to the
  hostile tribe is the recompence of the victory; but if they are
  vanquished, all is lost; and not only their herds and flocks, but their
  women and children become the booty of the conqueror. Even the greater
  part of those who survive the action are obliged to submit to him for the
  sake of immediate subsistence. The rest are commonly dissipated and
  dispersed in the desert.

  The ordinary life, the ordinary exercise of a Tartar or Arab, prepares him
  sufficiently for war. Running, wrestling, cudgel-playing, throwing the
  javelin, drawing the bow, etc. are the common pastimes of those who live
  in the open air, and are all of them the images of war. When a Tartar or
  Arab actually goes to war, he is maintained by his own herds and flocks,
  which he carries with him, in the same manner as in peace. His chief or
  sovereign (for those nations have all chiefs or sovereigns) is at no sort
  of expense in preparing him for the field; and when he is in it, the
  chance of plunder is the only pay which he either expects or requires.

  An army of hunters can seldom exceed two or three hundred men. The
  precarious subsistence which the chace affords, could seldom allow a
  greater number to keep together for any considerable time. An army of
  shepherds, on the contrary, may sometimes amount to two or three hundred
  thousand. As long as nothing stops their progress, as long as they can go
  on from one district, of which they have consumed the forage, to another,
  which is yet entire; there seems to be scarce any limit to the number who
  can march on together. A nation of hunters can never be formidable to the
  civilized nations in their neighbourhood; a nation of shepherds may.
  Nothing can be more contemptible than an Indian war in North America;
  nothing, on the contrary, can be more dreadful than a Tartar invasion has
  frequently been in Asia. The judgment of Thucydides, that both Europe and
  Asia could not resist the Scythians united, has been verified by the
  experience of all ages. The inhabitants of the extensive, but defenceless
  plains of Scythia or Tartary, have been frequently united under the
  dominion of the chief of some conquering horde or clan; and the havock and
  devastation of Asia have always signalized their union. The inhabitants of
  the inhospitable deserts of Arabia, the other great nation of shepherds,
  have never been united but once, under Mahomet and his immediate
  successors. Their union, which was more the effect of religious enthusiasm
  than of conquest, was signalized in the same manner. If the hunting
  nations of America should ever become shepherds, their neighbourhood would
  be much more dangerous to the European colonies than it is at present.

  In a yet more advanced state of society, among those nations of husbandmen
  who have little foreign commerce, and no other manufactures but those
  coarse and household ones, which almost every private family prepares for
  its own use, every man, in the same manner, either is a warrior, or easily
  becomes such. Those who live by agriculture generally pass the whole day
  in the open air, exposed to all the inclemencies of the seasons. The
  hardiness of their ordinary life prepares them for the fatigues of war, to
  some of which their necessary occupations bear a great analogy. The
  necessary occupation of a ditcher prepares him to work in the trenches,
  and to fortify a camp, as well as to inclose a field. The ordinary
  pastimes of such husbandmen are the same as those of shepherds, and are in
  the same manner the images of war. But as husbandmen have less leisure
  than shepherds, they are not so frequently employed in those pastimes.
  They are soldiers but soldiers not quite so much masters of their
  exercise. Such as they are, however, it seldom costs the sovereign or
  commonwealth any expense to prepare them for the field.

  Agriculture, even in its rudest and lowest state, supposes a settlement,
  some sort of fixed habitation, which cannot be abandoned without great
  loss. When a nation of mere husbandmen, therefore, goes to war, the whole
  people cannot take the field together. The old men, the women and
  children, at least, must remain at home, to take care of the habitation.
  All the men of the military age, however, may take the field, and in small
  nations of this kind, have frequently done so. In every nation, the men of
  the military age are supposed to amount to about a fourth or a fifth part
  of the whole body of the people. If the campaign, too, should begin after
  seedtime, and end before harvest, both the husbandman and his principal
  labourers can be spared from the farm without much loss. He trusts that
  the work which must be done in the mean time, can be well enough executed
  by the old men, the women, and the children. He is not unwilling,
  therefore, to serve without pay during a short campaign; and it frequently
  costs the sovereign or commonwealth as little to maintain him in the field
  as to prepare him for it. The citizens of all the different states of
  ancient Greece seem to have served in this manner till after the second
  Persian war; and the people of Peloponnesus till after the Peloponnesian
  war. The Peloponnesians, Thucydides observes, generally left the field in
  the summer, and returned home to reap the harvest. The Roman people, under
  their kings, and during the first ages of the republic, served in the same
  manner. It was not till the seige of Veii, that they who staid at home
  began to contribute something towards maintaining those who went to war.
  In the European monarchies, which were founded upon the ruins of the Roman
  empire, both before, and for some time after, the establishment of what is
  properly called the feudal law, the great lords, with all their immediate
  dependents, used to serve the crown at their own expense. In the field, in
  the same manner as at home, they maintained themselves by their own
  revenue, and not by any stipend or pay which they received from the king
  upon that particular occasion.

  In a more advanced state of society, two different causes contribute to
  render it altogether impossible that they who take the field should
  maintain themselves at their own expense. Those two causes are, the
  progress of manufactures, and the improvement in the art of war.

  Though a husbandman should be employed in an expedition, provided it
  begins after seedtime, and ends before harvest, the interruption of his
  business will not always occasion any considerable diminution of his
  revenue. Without the intervention of his labour, Nature does herself the
  greater part of the work which remains to be done. But the moment that an
  artificer, a smith, a carpenter, or a weaver, for example, quits his
  workhouse, the sole source of his revenue is completely dried up. Nature
  does nothing for him; he does all for himself. When he takes the field,
  therefore, in defence of the public, as he has no revenue to maintain
  himself, he must necessarily be maintained by the public. But in a
  country, of which a great part of the inhabitants are artificers and
  manufacturers, a great part of the people who go to war must be drawn from
  those classes, and must, therefore, be maintained by the public as long as
  they are employed in its service.

  When the art of war, too, has gradually grown up to be a very intricate
  and complicated science; when the event of war ceases to be determined, as
  in the first ages of society, by a single irregular skirmish or battle;
  but when the contest is generally spun out through several different
  campaigns, each of which lasts during the greater part of the year; it
  becomes universally necessary that the public should maintain those who
  serve the public in war, at least while they are employed in that service.
  Whatever, in time of peace, might be the ordinary occupation of those who
  go to war, so very tedious and expensive a service would otherwise be by
  far too heavy a burden upon them. After the second Persian war,
  accordingly, the armies of Athens seem to have been generally composed of
  mercenary troops, consisting, indeed, partly of citizens, but partly, too,
  of foreigners; and all of them equally hired and paid at the expense of
  the state. From the time of the siege of Veii, the armies of Rome received
  pay for their service during the time which they remained in the field.
  Under the feudal governments, the military service, both of the great
  lords, and of their immediate dependents, was, after a certain period,
  universally exchanged for a payment in money, which was employed to
  maintain those who served in their stead.

  The number of those who can go to war, in proportion to the whole number
  of the people, is necessarily much smaller in a civilized than in a rude
  state of society. In a civilized society, as the soldiers are maintained
  altogether by the labour of those who are not soldiers, the number of the
  former can never exceed what the latter can maintain, over and above
  maintaining, in a manner suitable to their respective stations, both
  themselves and the other officers of government and law, whom they are
  obliged to maintain. In the little agrarian states of ancient Greece, a
  fourth or a fifth part of the whole body of the people considered the
  themselves as soldiers, and would sometimes, it is said, take the field.
  Among the civilized nations of modern Europe, it is commonly computed,
  that not more than the one hundredth part of the inhabitants of any
  country can be employed as soldiers, without ruin to the country which
  pays the expense of their service.

  The expense of preparing the army for the field seems not to have become
  considerable in any nation, till long after that of maintaining it in the
  field had devolved entirely upon the sovereign or commonwealth. In all the
  different republics of ancient Greece, to learn his military exercises,
  was a necessary part of education imposed by the state upon every free
  citizen. In every city there seems to have been a public field, in which,
  under the protection of the public magistrate, the young people were
  taught their different exercises by different masters. In this very simple
  institution consisted the whole expense which any Grecian state seems ever
  to have been at, in preparing its citizens for war. In ancient Rome, the
  exercises of the Campus Martius answered the same purpose with those of
  the Gymnasium in ancient Greece. Under the feudal governments, the many
  public ordinances, that the citizens of every district should practise
  archery, as well as several other military exercises, were intended for
  promoting the same purpose, but do not seem to have promoted it so well.
  Either from want of interest in the officers entrusted with the execution
  of those ordinances, or from some other cause, they appear to have been
  universally neglected; and in the progress of all those governments,
  military exercises seem to have gone gradually into disuse among the great
  body of the people.

  In the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, during the whole period of
  their existence, and under the feudal governments, for a considerable time
  after their first establishment, the trade of a soldier was not a
  separate, distinct trade, which constituted the sole or principal
  occupation of a particular class of citizens; every subject of the state,
  whatever might be the ordinary trade or occupation by which he gained his
  livelihood, considered himself, upon all ordinary occasions, as fit
  likewise to exercise the trade of a soldier, and, upon many extraordinary
  occasions, as bound to exercise it.

  The art of war, however, as it is certainly the noblest of all arts, so,
  in the progress of improvement, it necessarily becomes one of the most
  complicated among them. The state of the mechanical, as well as some other
  arts, with which it is necessarily connected, determines the degree of
  perfection to which it is capable of being carried at any particular time.
  But in order to carry it to this degree of perfection, it is necessary
  that it should become the sole or principal occupation of a particular
  class of citizens; and the division of labour is as necessary for the
  improvement of this, as of every other art. Into other arts, the division
  of labour is naturally introduced by the prudence of individuals, who find
  that they promote their private interest better by confining themselves to
  a particular trade, than by exercising a great number. But it is the
  wisdom of the state only, which can render the trade of a soldier a
  particular trade, separate and distinct from all others. A private
  citizen, who, in time of profound peace, and without any particular
  encouragement from the public, should spend the greater part of his time
  in military exercises, might, no doubt, both improve himself very much in
  them, and amuse himself very well; but he certainly would not promote his
  own interest. It is the wisdom of the state only, which can render it for
  his interest to give up the greater part of his time to this peculiar
  occupation; and states have not always had this wisdom, even when their
  circumstances had become such, that the preservation of their existence
  required that they should have it.

  A shepherd has a great deal of leisure; a husbandman, in the rude state of
  husbandry, has some; an artificer or manufacturer has none at all. The
  first may, without any loss, employ a great deal of his time in martial
  exercises; the second may employ some part of it; but the last cannot
  employ a single hour in them without some loss, and his attention to his
  own interest naturally leads him to neglect them altogether. Those
  improvements in husbandry, too, which the progress of arts and
  manufactures necessarily introduces, leave the husbandman as little
  leisure as the artificer. Military exercises come to be as much neglected
  by the inhabitants of the country as by those of the town, and the great
  body of the people becomes altogether unwarlike. That wealth, at the same
  time, which always follows the improvements of agriculture and
  manufactures, and which, in reality, is no more than the accumulated
  produce of those improvements, provokes the invasion of all their
  neighbours. An industrious, and, upon that account, a wealthy nation, is
  of all nations the most likely to be attacked; and unless the state takes
  some new measure for the public defence, the natural habits of the people
  render them altogether incapable of defending themselves.

  In these circumstances, there seem to be but two methods by which the
  state can make any tolerable provision for the public defence.

  It may either, first, by means of a very rigorous police, and in spite of
  the whole bent of the interest, genius, and inclinations of the people,
  enforce the practice of military exercises, and oblige either all the
  citizens of the military age, or a certain number of them, to join in some
  measure the trade of a soldier to whatever other trade or profession they
  may happen to carry on.

  Or, secondly, by maintaining and employing a certain number of citizens in
  the constant practice of military exercises, it may render the trade of a
  soldier a particular trade, separate and distinct from all others.

  If the state has recourse to the first of those two expedients, its
  military force is said to consist in a militia; if to the second, it is
  said to consist in a standing army. The practice of military exercises is
  the sole or principal occupation of the soldiers of a standing army, and
  the maintenance or pay which the state affords them is the principal and
  ordinary fund of their subsistence. The practice of military exercises is
  only the occasional occupation of the soldiers of a militia, and they
  derive the principal and ordinary fund of their subsistence from some
  other occupation. In a militia, the character of the labourer, artificer,
  or tradesman, predominates over that of the soldier; in a standing army,
  that of the soldier predominates over every other character; and in this
  distinction seems to consist the essential difference between those two
  different species of military force.

  Militias have been of several different kinds. In some countries, the
  citizens destined for defending the state seem to have been exercised
  only, without being, if I may say so, regimented; that is, without being
  divided into separate and distinct bodies of troops, each of which
  performed its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers. In
  the republics of ancient Greece and Rome, each citizen, as long as he
  remained at home, seems to have practised his exercises, either separately
  and independently, or with such of his equals as he liked best; and not to
  have been attached to any particular body of troops, till he was actually
  called upon to take the field. In other countries, the militia has not
  only been exercised, but regimented. In England, in Switzerland, and, I
  believe, in every other country of modern Europe, where any imperfect
  military force of this kind has been established, every militiaman is,
  even in time of peace, attached to a particular body of troops, which
  performs its exercises under its own proper and permanent officers.

  Before the invention of fire-arms, that army was superior in which the
  soldiers had, each individually, the greatest skill and dexterity in the
  use of their arms. Strength and agility of body were of the highest
  consequence, and commonly determined the fate of battles. But this skill
  and dexterity in the use of their arms could be acquired only, in the same
  manner as fencing is at present, by practising, not in great bodies, but
  each man separately, in a particular school, under a particular master, or
  with his own particular equals and companions. Since the invention of
  fire-arms, strength and agility of body, or even extraordinary dexterity
  and skill in the use of arms, though they are far from being of no
  consequence, are, however, of less consequence. The nature of the weapon,
  though it by no means puts the awkward upon a level with the skilful, puts
  him more nearly so than he ever was before. All the dexterity and skill,
  it is supposed, which are necessary for using it, can be well enough
  acquired by practising in great bodies.

  Regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, are qualities which,
  in modern armies, are of more importance towards determining the fate of
  battles, than the dexterity and skill of the soldiers in the use of their
  arms. But the noise of fire-arms, the smoke, and the invisible death to
  which every man feels himself every moment exposed, as soon as he comes
  within cannon-shot, and frequently a long time before the battle can be
  well said to be engaged, must render it very difficult to maintain any
  considerable degree of this regularity, order, and prompt obedience, even
  in the beginning of a modern battle. In an ancient battle, there was no
  noise but what arose from the human voice; there was no smoke, there was
  no invisible cause of wounds or death. Every man, till some mortal weapon
  actually did approach him, saw clearly that no such weapon was near him.
  In these circumstances, and among troops who had some confidence in their
  own skill and dexterity in the use of their arms, it must have been a good
  deal less difficult to preserve some degree of regularity and order, not
  only in the beginning, but through the whole progress of an ancient
  battle, and till one of the two armies was fairly defeated. But the habits
  of regularity, order, and prompt obedience to command, can be acquired
  only by troops which are exercised in great bodies.

  A militia, however, in whatever manner it may be either disciplined or
  exercised, must always be much inferior to a well disciplined and well
  exercised standing army.

  The soldiers who are exercised only once a week, or once a-month, can
  never be so expert in the use of their arms, as those who are exercised
  every day, or every other day; and though this circumstance may not be of
  so much consequence in modern, as it was in ancient times, yet the
  acknowledged superiority of the Prussian troops, owing, it is said, very
  much to their superior expertness in their exercise, may satisfy us that
  it is, even at this day, of very considerable consequence.

  The soldiers, who are bound to obey their officer only once a-week, or
  once a-month, and who are at all other times at liberty to manage their
  own affairs their own way, without being, in any respect, accountable to
  him, can never be under the same awe in his presence, can never have the
  same disposition to ready obedience, with those whose whole life and
  conduct are every day directed by him, and who every day even rise and go
  to bed, or at least retire to their quarters, according to his orders. In
  what is called discipline, or in the habit of ready obedience, a militia
  must always be still more inferior to a standing army, than it may
  sometimes be in what is called the manual exercise, or in the management
  and use of its arms. But, in modern war, the habit of ready and instant
  obedience is of much greater consequence than a considerable superiority
  in the management of arms.

  Those militias which, like the Tartar or Arab militia, go to war under the
  same chieftains whom they are accustomed to obey in peace, are by far the
  best. In respect for their officers, in the habit of ready obedience, they
  approach nearest to standing armies. The Highland militia, when it served
  under its own chieftains, had some advantage of the same kind. As the
  Highlanders, however, were not wandering, but stationary shepherds, as
  they had all a fixed habitation, and were not, in peaceable times,
  accustomed to follow their chieftain from place to place; so, in time of
  war, they were less willing to follow him to any considerable distance, or
  to continue for any long time in the field. When they had acquired any
  booty, they were eager to return home, and his authority was seldom
  sufficient to detain them. In point of obedience, they were always much
  inferior to what is reported of the Tartars and Arabs. As the Highlanders,
  too, from their stationary life, spend less of their time in the open air,
  they were always less accustomed to military exercises, and were less
  expert in the use of their arms than the Tartars and Arabs are said to be.

  A militia of any kind, it must be observed, however, which has served for
  several successive campaigns in the field, becomes in every respect a
  standing army. The soldiers are every day exercised in the use of their
  arms, and, being constantly under the command of their officers, are
  habituated to the same prompt obedience which takes place in standing
  armies. What they were before they took the field, is of little
  importance. They necessarily become in every respect a standing army,
  after they have passed a few campaigns in it. Should the war in America
  drag out through another campaign, the American militia may become, in
  every respect, a match for that standing army, of which the valour
  appeared, in the last war at least, not inferior to that of the hardiest
  veterans of France and Spain.

  This distinction being well understood, the history of all ages, it will
  be found, hears testimony to the irresistible superiority which a well
  regulated standing army has over a militia.

  One of the first standing armies, of which we have any distinct account in
  any well authenticated history, is that of Philip of Macedon. His frequent
  wars with the Thracians, Illyrians, Thessalians, and some of the Greek
  cities in the neighbourhood of Macedon, gradually formed his troops, which
  in the beginning were probably militia, to the exact discipline of a
  standing army. When he was at peace, which he was very seldom, and never
  for any long time together, he was careful not to disband that army. It
  vanquished and subdued, after a long and violent struggle, indeed, the
  gallant and well exercised militias of the principal republics of ancient
  Greece; and afterwards, with very little struggle, the effeminate and ill
  exercised militia of the great Persian empire. The fall of the Greek
  republics, and of the Persian empire was the effect of the irresistible
  superiority which a standing arm has over every other sort of militia. It
  is the first great revolution in the affairs of mankind of which history
  has preserved any distinct and circumstantial account.

  The fall of Carthage, and the consequent elevation of Rome, is the second.
  All the varieties in the fortune of those two famous republics may very
  well be accounted for from the same cause.

  From the end of the first to the beginning of the second Carthaginian war,
  the armies of Carthage were continually in the field, and employed under
  three great generals, who succeeded one another in the command; Amilcar,
  his son-in-law Asdrubal, and his son Annibal: first in chastising their
  own rebellious slaves, afterwards in subduing the revolted nations of
  Africa; and lastly, in conquering the great kingdom of Spain. The army
  which Annibal led from Spain into Italy must necessarily, in those
  different wars, have been gradually formed to the exact discipline of a
  standing army. The Romans, in the meantime, though they had not been
  altogether at peace, yet they had not, during this period, been engaged in
  any war of very great consequence; and their military discipline, it is
  generally said, was a good deal relaxed. The Roman armies which Annibal
  encountered at Trebi, Thrasymenus, and Cannae, were militia opposed to a
  standing army. This circumstance, it is probable, contributed more than
  any other to determine the fate of those battles.

  The standing army which Annibal left behind him in Spain had the like
  superiority over the militia which the Romans sent to oppose it; and, in a
  few years, under the command of his brother, the younger Asdrubal,
  expelled them almost entirely from that country.

  Annibal was ill supplied from home. The Roman militia, being continually
  in the field, became, in the progress of the war, a well disciplined and
  well exercised standing army; and the superiority of Annibal grew every
  day less and less. Asdrubal judged it necessary to lead the whole, or
  almost the whole, of the standing army which he commanded in Spain, to the
  assistance of his brother in Italy. In this march, he is said to have been
  misled by his guides; and in a country which he did not know, was
  surprised and attacked, by another standing army, in every respect equal
  or superior to his own, and was entirely defeated.

  When Asdrubal had left Spain, the great Scipio found nothing to oppose him
  but a militia inferior to his own. He conquered and subdued that militia,
  and, in the course of the war, his own militia necessarily became a well
  disciplined and well exercised standing army. That standing army was
  afterwards carried to Africa, where it found nothing but a militia to
  oppose it. In order to defend Carthage, it became necessary to recal the
  standing army of Annibal. The disheartened and frequently defeated African
  militia joined it, and, at the battle of Zama, composed the greater part
  of the troops of Annibal. The event of that day determined the fate of the
  two rival republics.

  From the end of the second Carthaginian war till the fall of the Roman
  republic, the armies of Rome were in every respect standing armies. The
  standing army of Macedon made some resistance to their arms. In the height
  of their grandeur, it cost them two great wars, and three great battles,
  to subdue that little kingdom, of which the conquest would probably have
  been still more difficult, had it not been for the cowardice of its last
  king. The militias of all the civilized nations of the ancient world, of
  Greece, of Syria, and of Egypt, made but a feeble resistance to the
  standing armies of Rome. The militias of some barbarous nations defended
  themselves much better. The Scythian or Tartar militia, which Mithridates
  drew from the countries north of the Euxine and Caspian seas, were the
  most formidable enemies whom the Romans had to encounter after the second
  Carthaginian war. The Parthian and German militias, too, were always
  respectable, and upon several occasions, gained very considerable
  advantages over the Roman armies. In general, however, and when the Roman
  armies were well commanded, they appear to have been very much superior;
  and if the Romans did not pursue the final conquest either of Parthia or
  Germany, it was probably because they judged that it was not worth while
  to add those two barbarous countries to an empire which was already too
  large. The ancient Parthians appear to have been a nation of Scythian or
  Tartar extraction, and to have always retained a good deal of the manners
  of their ancestors. The ancient Germans were, like the Scythians or
  Tartars, a nation of wandering shepherds, who went to war under the same
  chiefs whom they were accustomed to follow in peace. ‘Their militia was
  exactly of the same kind with that of the Scythians or Tartars, from whom,
  too, they were probably descended.’

  Many different causes contributed to relax the discipline of the Roman
  armies. Its extreme severity was, perhaps, one of those causes. In the
  days of their grandeur, when no enemy appeared capable of opposing them,
  their heavy armour was laid aside as unnecessarily burdensome, their
  laborious exercises were neglected, as unnecessarily toilsome. Under the
  Roman emperors, besides, the standing armies of Rome, those particularly
  which guarded the German and Pannonian frontiers, became dangerous to
  their masters, against whom they used frequently to set up their own
  generals. In order to render them less formidable, according to some
  authors, Dioclesian, according to others, Constantine, first withdrew them
  from the frontier, where they had always before been encamped in great
  bodies, generally of two or three legions each, and dispersed them in
  small bodies through the different provincial towns, from whence they were
  scarce ever removed, but when it became necessary to repel an invasion.
  Small bodies of soldiers, quartered in trading and manufacturing towns,
  and seldom removed from those quarters, became themselves trades men,
  artificers, and manufacturers. The civil came to predominate over the
  military character; and the standing armies of Rome gradually degenerated
  into a corrupt, neglected, and undisciplined militia, incapable of
  resisting the attack of the German and Scythian militias, which soon
  afterwards invaded the western empire. It was only by hiring the militia
  of some of those nations to oppose to that of others, that the emperors
  were for some time able to defend themselves. The fall of the western
  empire is the third great revolution in the affairs of mankind, of which
  ancient history has preserved any distinct or circumstantial account. It
  was brought about by the irresistible superiority which the militia of a
  barbarous has over that of a civilized nation; which the militia of a
  nation of shepherds has over that of a nation of husbandmen, artificers,
  and manufacturers. The victories which have been gained by militias have
  generally been, not over standing armies, but over other militias, in
  exercise and discipline inferior to themselves. Such were the victories
  which the Greek militia gained over that of the Persian empire; and such,
  too, were those which, in later times, the Swiss militia gained over that
  of the Austrians and Burgundians.

  The military force of the German and Scythian nations, who established
  themselves upon ruins of the western empire, continued for some time to be
  of the same kind in their new settlements, as it had been in their
  original country. It was a militia of shepherds and husbandmen, which, in
  time of war, took the field under the command of the same chieftains whom
  it was accustomed to obey in peace. It was, therefore, tolerably well
  exercised, and tolerably well disciplined. As arts and industry advanced,
  however, the authority of the chieftains gradually decayed, and the great
  body of the people had less time to spare for military exercises. Both the
  discipline and the exercise of the feudal militia, therefore, went
  gradually to ruin, and standing armies were gradually introduced to supply
  the place of it. When the expedient of a standing army, besides, had once
  been adopted by one civilized nation, it became necessary that all its
  neighbours should follow the example. They soon found that their safety
  depended upon their doing so, and that their own militia was altogether
  incapable of resisting the attack of such an army.

  The soldiers of a standing army, though they may never have seen an enemy,
  yet have frequently appeared to possess all the courage of veteran troops,
  and, the very moment that they took the field, to have been fit to face
  the hardiest and most experienced veterans. In 1756, when the Russian army
  marched into Poland, the valour of the Russian soldiers did not appear
  inferior to that of the Prussians, at that time supposed to be the
  hardiest and most experienced veterans in Europe. The Russian empire,
  however, had enjoyed a profound peace for near twenty years before, and
  could at that time have very few soldiers who had ever seen an enemy. When
  the Spanish war broke out in 1739, England had enjoyed a profound peace
  for about eight-and-twenty years. The valour of her soldiers, however, far
  from being corrupted by that long peace, was never more distinguished than
  in the attempt upon Carthagena, the first unfortunate exploit of that
  unfortunate war. In a long peace, the generals, perhaps, may sometimes
  forget their skill; but where a well regulated standing army has been kept
  up, the soldiers seem never to forget their valour.

  When a civilized nation depends for its defence upon a militia, it is at
  all times exposed to be conquered by any barbarous nation which happens to
  be in its neighbourhood. The frequent conquests of all the civilized
  countries in Asia by the Tartars, sufficiently demonstrates the natural
  superiority which the militia of a barbarous has over that of a civilized
  nation. A well regulated standing army is superior to every militia. Such
  an army, as it can best be maintained by an opulent and civilized nation,
  so it can alone defend such a nation against the invasion of a poor and
  barbarous neighbour. It is only by means of a standing army, therefore,
  that the civilization of any country can be perpetuated, or even
  preserved, for any considerable time.

  As it is only by means of a well regulated standing army, that a civilized
  country can be defended, so it is only by means of it that a barbarous
  country can be suddenly and tolerably civilized. A standing army
  establishes, with an irresistible force, the law of the sovereign through
  the remotest provinces of the empire, and maintains some degree of regular
  government in countries which could not otherwise admit of any. Whoever
  examines with attention, the improvements which Peter the Great introduced
  into the Russian empire, will find that they almost all resolve themselves
  into the establishment of a well regulated standing army. It is the
  instrument which executes and maintains all his other regulations. That
  degree of order and internal peace, which that empire has ever since
  enjoyed, is altogether owing to the influence of that army.

  Men of republican principles have been jealous of a standing army, as
  dangerous to liberty. It certainly is so, wherever the interest of the
  general, and that of the principal officers, are not necessarily connected
  with the support of the constitution of the state. The standing army of
  Caesar destroyed the Roman republic. The standing army of Cromwell turned
  the long parliament out of doors. But where the sovereign is himself the
  general, and the principal nobility and gentry of the country the chief
  officers of the army; where the military force is placed under the command
  of those who have the greatest interest in the support of the civil
  authority, because they have themselves the greatest share of that
  authority, a standing army can never be dangerous to liberty. On the
  contrary, it may, in some cases, be favourable to liberty. The security
  which it gives to the sovereign renders unnecessary that troublesome
  jealousy, which, in some modern republics, seems to watch over the
  minutest actions, and to be at all times ready to disturb the peace of
  every citizen. Where the security of the magistrate, though supported by
  the principal people of the country, is endangered by every popular
  discontent; where a small tumult is capable of bringing about in a few
  hours a great revolution, the whole authority of government must be
  employed to suppress and punish every murmur and complaint against it. To
  a sovereign, on the contrary, who feels himself supported, not only by the
  natural aristocracy of the country, but by a well regulated standing army,
  the rudest, the most groundless, and the most licentious remonstrances,
  can give little disturbance. He can safely pardon or neglect them, and his
  consciousness of his own superiority naturally disposes him to do so. That
  degree of liberty which approaches to licentiousness, can be tolerated
  only in countries where the sovereign is secured by a well regulated
  standing army. It is in such countries only, that the public safety does
  not require that the sovereign should be trusted with any discretionary
  power, for suppressing even the impertinent wantonness of this licentious
  liberty.

  The first duty of the sovereign, therefore, that of defending the society
  from the violence and injustice of other independent societies, grows
  gradually more and more expensive, as the society advances in
  civilization. The military force of the society, which originally cost the
  sovereign no expense, either in time of peace, or in time of war, must, in
  the progress of improvement, first be maintained by him in time of war,
  and afterwards even in time of peace.

  The great change introduced into the art of war by the invention of
  fire-arms, has enhanced still further both the expense of exercising and
  disciplining any particular number of soldiers in time of peace, and that
  of employing them in time of war. Both their arms and their ammunition are
  become more expensive. A musket is a more expensive machine than a javelin
  or a bow and arrows; a cannon or a mortar, than a balista or a catapulta.
  The powder which is spent in a modern review is lost irrecoverably, and
  occasions a very considerable expense. The javelins and arrows which were
  thrown or shot in an ancient one, could easily be picked up again, and
  were, besides, of very little value. The cannon and the mortar are not
  only much dearer, but much heavier machines than the balista or catapulta;
  and require a greater expense, not only to prepare them for the field, but
  to carry them to it. As the superiority of the modern artillery, too, over
  that of the ancients, is very great; it has become much more difficult,
  and consequently much more expensive, to fortify a town, so as to resist,
  even for a few weeks, the a

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