Chapter Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions.

PART III. Of the Expense of public Works and public Institutions.

  The third and last duty of the sovereign or commonwealth, is that of
  erecting and maintaining those public institutions and those public works,
  which though they may be in the highest degree advantageous to a great
  society, are, however, of such a nature, that the profit could never repay
  the expense to any individual, or small number of individuals; and which
  it, therefore, cannot be expected that any individual, or small number of
  individuals, should erect or maintain. The performance of this duty
  requires, too, very different degrees of expense in the different periods
  of society.

  After the public institutions and public works necessary for the defence
  of the society, and for the administration of justice, both of which have
  already been mentioned, the other works and institutions of this kind are
  chiefly for facilitating the commerce of the society, and those for
  promoting the instruction of the people. The institutions for instruction
  are of two kinds: those for the education of the youth, and those for the
  instruction of people of all ages. The consideration of the manner in
  which the expense of those different sorts of public works and
  institutions may be most properly defrayed will divide this third part of
  the present chapter into three different articles.

  ARTICLE I.—Of the public Works and Institutions for facilitating the
  Commerce of the Society.

  And, first, of those which are necessary for facilitating Commerce in
  general.

  That the erection and maintenance of the public works which facilitate the
  commerce of any country, such as good roads, bridges, navigable canals,
  harbours, etc. must require very different degrees of expense in the
  different periods of society, is evident without any proof. The expense of
  making and maintaining the public roads of any country must evidently
  increase with the annual produce of the land and labour of that country,
  or with the quantity and weight of the goods which it becomes necessary to
  fetch and carry upon those roads. The strength of a bridge must be suited
  to the number and weight of the carriages which are likely to pass over
  it. The depth and the supply of water for a navigable canal must be
  proportioned to the number and tonnage of the lighters which are likely to
  carry goods upon it; the extent of a harbour, to the number of the
  shipping which are likely to take shelter in it.

  It does not seem necessary that the expense of those public works should
  be defrayed from that public revenue, as it is commonly called, of which
  the collection and application are in most countries, assigned to the
  executive power. The greater part of such public works may easily be so
  managed, as to afford a particular revenue, sufficient for defraying their
  own expense without bringing any burden upon the general revenue of the
  society.

  A highway, a bridge, a navigable canal, for example, may, in most cases,
  be both made add maintained by a small toll upon the carriages which make
  use of them; a harbour, by a moderate port-duty upon the tonnage of the
  shipping which load or unload in it. The coinage, another institution for
  facilitating commerce, in many countries, not only defrays its own
  expense, but affords a small revenue or a seignorage to the sovereign. The
  post-office, another institution for the same purpose, over and above
  defraying its own expense, affords, in almost all countries, a very
  considerable revenue to the sovereign.

  When the carriages which pass over a highway or a bridge, and the lighters
  which sail upon a navigable canal, pay toll in proportion to their weight
  or their tonnage, they pay for the maintenance of those public works
  exactly in proportion to the wear and tear which they occasion of them. It
  seems scarce possible to invent a more equitable way of maintaining such
  works. This tax or toll, too, though it is advanced by the carrier, is
  finally paid by the consumer, to whom it must always be charged in the
  price of the goods. As the expense of carriage, however, is very much
  reduced by means of such public works, the goods, notwithstanding the
  toll, come cheaper to the consumer than they could otherwise have done,
  their price not being so much raised by the toll, as it is lowered by the
  cheapness of the carriage. The person who finally pays this tax,
  therefore, gains by the application more than he loses by the payment of
  it. His payment is exactly in proportion to his gain. It is, in reality,
  no more than a part of that gain which he is obliged to give up, in order
  to get the rest. It seems impossible to imagine a more equitable method of
  raising a tax. When the toll upon carriages of luxury, upon coaches,
  post-chaises, etc. is made somewhat higher in proportion to their weight,
  than upon carriages of necessary use, such as carts, waggons, etc. the
  indolence and vanity of the rich is made to contribute, in a very easy
  manner, to the relief of the poor, by rendering cheaper the transportation
  of heavy goods to all the different parts of the country.

  When high-roads, bridges, canals, etc. are in this manner made and
  supported by the commerce which is carried on by means of them, they can
  be made only where that commerce requires them, and, consequently, where
  it is proper to make them. Their expense, too, their grandeur and
  magnificence, must be suited to what that commerce can afford to pay. They
  must be made, consequently, as it is proper to make them. A magnificent
  high-road cannot be made through a desert country, where there is little
  or no commerce, or merely because it happens to lead to the country villa
  of the intendant of the province, or to that of some great lord, to whom
  the intendant finds it convenient to make his court. A great bridge cannot
  be thrown over a river at a place where nobody passes, or merely to
  embellish the view from the windows of a neighbouring palace; things which
  sometimes happen in countries, where works of this kind are carried on by
  any other revenue than that which they themselves are capable of
  affording.

  In several different parts of Europe, the toll or lock-duty upon a canal
  is the property of private persons, whose private interest obliges them to
  keep up the canal. If it is not kept in tolerable order, the navigation
  necessarily ceases altogether, and, along with it, the whole profit which
  they can make by the tolls. If those tolls were put under the management
  of commissioners, who had themselves no interest in them, they might be
  less attentive to the maintenance of the works which produced them. The
  canal of Languedoc cost the king of France and the province upwards of
  thirteen millions of livres, which (at twenty-eight livres the mark of
  silver, the value of French money in the end of the last century) amounted
  to upwards of nine hundred thousand pounds sterling. When that great work
  was finished, the most likely method, it was found, of keeping it in
  constant repair, was to make a present of the tolls to Riquet, the
  engineer who planned and conducted the work. Those tolls constitute, at
  present, a very large estate to the different branches of the family of
  that gentleman, who have, therefore, a great interest to keep the work in
  constant repair. But had those tolls been put under the management of
  commissioners, who had no such interest, they might perhaps, have been
  dissipated in ornamental and unnecessary expenses, while the most
  essential parts of the works were allowed to go to ruin.

  The tolls for the maintenance of a highroad cannot, with any safety, be
  made the property of private persons. A high-road, though entirely
  neglected, does not become altogether impassable, though a canal does. The
  proprietors of the tolls upon a high-road, therefore, might neglect
  altogether the repair of the road, and yet continue to levy very nearly
  the same tolls. It is proper, therefore, that the tolls for the
  maintenance of such a work should be put under the management of
  commissioners or trustees.

  In Great Britain, the abuses which the trustees have committed in the
  management of those tolls, have, in many cases, been very justly
  complained of. At many turnpikes, it has been said, the money levied is
  more than double of what is necessary for executing, in the completest
  manner, the work, which is often executed in a very slovenly manner, and
  sometimes not executed at all. The system of repairing the high-roads by
  tolls of this kind, it must be observed, is not of very long standing. We
  should not wonder, therefore, if it has not yet been brought to that
  degree of perfection of which it seems capable. If mean and improper
  persons are frequently appointed trustees; and if proper courts of
  inspection and account have not yet been established for controlling their
  conduct, and for reducing the tolls to what is barely sufficient for
  executing the work to be done by them; the recency of the institution both
  accounts and apologizes for those defects, of which, by the wisdom of
  parliament, the greater part may, in due time, be gradually remedied.

  The money levied at the different turnpikes in Great Britain, is supposed
  to exceed so much what is necessary for repairing the roads, that the
  savings which, with proper economy, might be made from it, have been
  considered, even by some ministers, as a very great resource, which might,
  at some time or another, be applied to the exigencies of the state.
  Government, it has been said, by taking the management of the turnpikes
  into its own hands, and by employing the soldiers, who would work for a
  very small addition to their pay, could keep the roads in good order, at a
  much less expense than it can be done by trustees, who have no other
  workmen to employ, but such as derive their whole subsistence from their
  wages. A great revenue, half a million, perhaps {Since publishing the two
  first editions of this book, I have got good reasons to believe that all
  the turnpike tolls levied in Great Britain do not produce a neat revenue
  that amounts to half a million; a sum which, under the management of
  government, would not be sufficient to keep in repair five of the
  principal roads in the kingdom}, it has been pretended, might in this
  manner be gained, without laying any new burden upon the people; and the
  turnpike roads might be made to contribute to the general expense of the
  state, in the same manner as the post-office does at present.

  That a considerable revenue might be gained in this manner, I have no
  doubt, though probably not near so much as the projectors of this plan
  have supposed. The plan itself, however, seems liable to several very
  important objections.

  First, If the tolls which are levied at the turnpikes should ever be
  considered as one of the resources for supplying the exigencies of the
  state, they would certainly be augmented as those exigencies were supposed
  to require. According to the policy of Great Britain, therefore, they
  would probably he augmented very fast. The facility with which a great
  revenue could be drawn from them, would probably encourage administration
  to recur very frequently te this resource. Though it may, perhaps, be more
  than doubtful whether half a million could by any economy be saved out of
  the present tolls, it can scarcely be doubted, but that a million might be
  saved out of them, if they were doubled; and perhaps two millions, if they
  were tripled {I have now good reason to believe that all these conjectural
  sums are by much too large.}. This great revenue, too, might be levied
  without the appointment of a single new officer to collect and receive it.
  But the turnpike tolls, being continually augmented in this manner,
  instead of facilitating the inland commerce of the country, as at present,
  would soon become a very great incumbrance upon it. The expense of
  transporting all heavy goods from one part of the country to another,
  would soon be so much increased, the market for all such goods,
  consequently, would soon be so much narrowed, that their production would
  be in a great measure discouraged, and the most important branches of the
  domestic industry of the country annihilated altogether.

  Secondly, A tax upon carriages, in proportion to their weight, though a
  very equal tax when applied to the sole purpose of repairing the roads, is
  a very unequal one when applied to any other purpose, or to supply the
  common exigencies of the state. When it is applied to the sole purpose
  above mentioned, each carriage is supposed to pay exactly for the wear and
  tear which that carriage occasions of the roads. But when it is applied to
  any other purpose, each carriage is supposed to pay for more than that
  wear and tear, and contributes to the supply of some other exigency of the
  state. But as the turnpike toll raises the price of goods in proportion to
  their weight and not to their value, it is chiefly paid by the consumers
  of coarse and bulky, not by those of precious and light commodities.
  Whatever exigency of the state, therefore, this tax might be intended to
  supply, that exigency would be chiefly supplied at the expense of the
  poor, not of the rich; at the expense of those who are least able to
  supply it, not of those who are most able.

  Thirdly, If government should at any time neglect the reparation of the
  high-roads, it would be still more difficult, than it is at present, to
  compel the proper application of any part of the turnpike tolls. A large
  revenue might thus be levied upon the people, without any part of it being
  applied to the only purpose to which a revenue levied in this manner ought
  ever to be applied. If the meanness and poverty of the trustees of
  turnpike roads render it sometimes difficult, at present, to oblige them
  to repair their wrong; their wealth and greatness would render it ten
  times more so in the case which is here supposed.

  In France, the funds destined for the reparation of the high-roads are
  under the immediate direction of the executive power. Those funds consist,
  partly in a certain number of days labour, which the country people are in
  most parts of Europe obliged to give to the reparation of the highways;
  and partly in such a portion of the general revenue of the state as the
  king chooses to spare from his other expenses.

  By the ancient law of France, as well as by that of most other parts of
  Europe, the labour of the country people was under the direction of a
  local or provincial magistracy, which had no immediate dependency upon the
  king’s council. But, by the present practice, both the labour of the
  country people, and whatever other fund the king may choose to assign for
  the reparation of the high-roads in any particular province or generality,
  are entirely under the management of the intendant; an officer who is
  appointed and removed by the king’s council who receives his orders from
  it, and is in constant correspondence with it. In the progress of
  despotism, the authority of the executive power gradually absorbs that of
  every other power in the state, and assumes to itself the management of
  every branch of revenue which is destined for any public purpose. In
  France, however, the great post-roads, the roads which make the
  communication between the principal towns of the kingdom, are in general
  kept in good order; and, in some provinces, are even a good deal superior
  to the greater part of the turnpike roads of England. But what we call the
  cross roads, that is, the far greater part of the roads in the country,
  are entirely neglected, and are in many places absolutely impassable for
  any heavy carriage. In some places it is even dangerous to travel on
  horseback, and mules are the only conveyance which can safely be trusted.
  The proud minister of an ostentatious court, may frequently take pleasure
  in executing a work of splendour and magnificence, such as a great
  highway, which is frequently seen by the principal nobility, whose
  applauses not only flatter his vanity, but even contribute to support his
  interest at court. But to execute a great number of little works, in which
  nothing that can be done can make any great appearance, or excite the
  smallest degree of admiration in any traveller, and which, in short, have
  nothing to recommend them but their extreme utility, is a business which
  appears, in every respect, too mean and paltry to merit the attention of
  so great a magistrate. Under such an administration therefore, such works
  are almost always entirely neglected.

  In China, and in several other governments of Asia, the executive power
  charges itself both with the reparation of the high-roads, and with the
  maintenance of the navigable canals. In the instructions which are given
  to the governor of each province, those objects, it is said, are
  constantly recommended to him, and the judgment which the court forms of
  his conduct is very much regulated by the attention which he appears to
  have paid to this part of his instructions. This branch of public police,
  accordingly, is said to be very much attended to in all those countries,
  but particularly in China, where the high-roads, and still more the
  navigable canals, it is pretended, exceed very much every thing of the
  same kind which is known in Europe. The accounts of those works, however,
  which have been transmitted to Europe, have generally been drawn up by
  weak and wondering travellers; frequently by stupid and lying
  missionaries. If they had been examined by more intelligent eyes, and if
  the accounts of them had been reported by more faithful witnesses, they
  would not, perhaps, appear to be so wonderful. The account which Bernier
  gives of some works of this kind in Indostan, falls very short of what had
  been reported of them by other travellers, more disposed to the marvellous
  than he was. It may too, perhaps, be in those countries, as it is in
  France, where the great roads, the great communications, which are likely
  to be the subjects of conversation at the court and in the capital, are
  attended to, and all the rest neglected. In China, besides, in Indostan,
  and in several other governments of Asia, the revenue of the sovereign
  arises almost altogether from a land tax or land rent, which rises or
  falls with the rise and fall of the annual produce of the land. The great
  interest of the sovereign, therefore, his revenue, is in such countries
  necessarily and immediately connected with the cultivation of the land,
  with the greatness of its produce, and with the value of its produce. But
  in order to render that produce both as great and as valuable as possible,
  it is necessary to procure to it as extensive a market as possible, and
  consequently to establish the freest, the easiest, and the least expensive
  communication between all the different parts of the country; which can be
  done only by means of the best roads and the best navigable canals. But
  the revenue of the sovereign does not, in any part of Europe, arise
  chiefly from a land tax or land rent. In all the great kingdoms of Europe,
  perhaps, the greater part of it may ultimately depend upon the produce of
  the land: but that dependency is neither so immediate nor so evident. In
  Europe, therefore, the sovereign does not feel himself so directly called
  upon to promote the increase, both in quantity and value of the produce of
  the land, or, by maintaining good roads and canals, to provide the most
  extensive market for that produce. Though it should be true, therefore,
  what I apprehend is not a little doubtful, that in some parts of Asia this
  department of the public police is very properly managed by the executive
  power, there is not the least probability that, during the present state
  of things, it could be tolerably managed by that power in any part of
  Europe.

  Even those public works, which are of such a nature that they cannot
  afford any revenue for maintaining themselves, but of which the
  conveniency is nearly confined to some particular place or district, are
  always better maintained by a local or provincial revenue, under the
  management of a local and provincial administration, than by the general
  revenue of the state, of which the executive power must always have the
  management. Were the streets of London to be lighted and paved at the
  expense of the treasury, is there any probability that they would be so
  well lighted and paved as they are at present, or even at so small an
  expense? The expense, besides, instead of being raised by a local tax upon
  the inhabitants of each particular street, parish, or district in London,
  would, in this case, be defrayed out of the general revenue of the state,
  and would consequently be raised by a tax upon all the inhabitants of the
  kingdom, of whom the greater part derive no sort of benefit from the
  lighting and paving of the streets of London.

  The abuses which sometimes creep into the local and provincial
  administration of a local and provincial revenue, how enormous soever they
  may appear, are in reality, however, almost always very trifling in
  comparison of those which commonly take place in the administration and
  expenditure of the revenue of a great empire. They are, besides, much more
  easily corrected. Under the local or provincial administration of the
  justices of the peace in Great Britain, the six days labour which the
  country people are obliged to give to the reparation of the highways, is
  not always, perhaps, very judiciously applied, but it is scarce ever
  exacted with any circumstance of cruelty or oppression. In France, under
  the administration of the intendants, the application is not always more
  judicious, and the exaction is frequently the most cruel and oppressive.
  Such corvees, as they are called, make one of the principal instruments of
  tyranny by which those officers chastise any parish or communeaute, which
  has had the misfortune to fall under their displeasure.

  Of the public Works and Institution which are necessary for facilitating
  particular Branches of Commerce.

  The object of the public works and institutions above mentioned, is to
  facilitate commerce in general. But in order to facilitate some particular
  branches of it, particular institutions are necessary, which again require
  a particular and extraordinary expense.

  Some particular branches of commerce which are carried on with barbarous
  and uncivilized nations, require extraordinary protection. An ordinary
  store or counting-house could give little security to the goods of the
  merchants who trade to the western coast of Africa. To defend them from
  the barbarous natives, it is necessary that the place where they are
  deposited should be in some measure fortified. The disorders in the
  government of Indostan have been supposed to render a like precaution
  necessary, even among that mild and gentle people; and it was under
  pretence of securing their persons and property from violence, that both
  the English and French East India companies were allowed to erect the
  first forts which they possessed in that country. Among other nations,
  whose vigorous government will suffer no strangers to possess any
  fortified place within their territory, it may be necessary to maintain
  some ambassador, minister, or consul, who may both decide, according to
  their own customs, the differences arising among his own countrymen, and,
  in their disputes with the natives, may by means of his public character,
  interfere with more authority and afford them a more powerful protection
  than they could expect from any private man. The interests of commerce
  have frequently made it necessary to maintain ministers in foreign
  countries, where the purposes either of war or alliance would not have
  required any. The commerce of the Turkey company first occasioned the
  establishment of an ordinary ambassador at Constantinople. The first
  English embassies to Russia arose altogether from commercial interests.
  The constant interference with those interests, necessarily occasioned
  between the subjects of the different states of Europe, has probably
  introduced the custom of keeping, in all neighbouring countries,
  ambassadors or ministers constantly resident, even in the time of peace.
  This custom, unknown to ancient times, seems not to be older than the end
  of the fifteenth, or beginning of the sixteenth century; that is, than the
  time when commerce first began to extend itself to the greater part of the
  nations of Europe, and when they first began to attend to its interests.

  It seems not unreasonable, that the extraordinary expense which the
  protection of any particular branch of commerce may occasion, should be
  defrayed by a moderate tax upon that particular branch; by a moderate
  fine, for example, to be paid by the traders when they first enter into
  it; or, what is more equal, by a particular duty of so much per cent. upon
  the goods which they either import into, or export out of, the particular
  countries with which it is carried on. The protection of trade, in
  general, from pirates and freebooters, is said to have given occasion to
  the first institution of the duties of customs. But, if it was thought
  reasonable to lay a general tax upon trade, in order to defray the expense
  of protecting trade in general, it should seem equally reasonable to lay a
  particular tax upon a particular branch of trade, in order to defray the
  extraordinary expense of protecting that branch.

  The protection of trade, in general, has always been considered as
  essential to the defence of the commonwealth, and, upon that account, a
  necessary part of the duty of the executive power. The collection and
  application of the general duties of customs, therefore, have always been
  left to that power. But the protection of any particular branch of trade
  is a part of the general protection of trade; a part, therefore, of the
  duty of that power; and if nations always acted consistently, the
  particular duties levied for the purposes of such particular protection,
  should always have been left equally to its disposal. But in this respect,
  as well as in many others, nations have not always acted consistently; and
  in the greater part of the commercial states of Europe, particular
  companies of merchants have had the address to persuade the legislature to
  entrust to them the performance of this part of the duty of the sovereign,
  together with all the powers which are necessarily connected with it.

  These companies, though they may, perhaps, have been useful for the first
  introduction of some branches of commerce, by making, at their own
  expense, an experiment which the state might not think it prudent to make,
  have in the long-run proved, universally, either burdensome or useless,
  and have either mismanaged or confined the trade.

  When those companies do not trade upon a joint stock, but are obliged to
  admit any person, properly qualified, upon paying a certain fine, and
  agreeing to submit to the regulations of the company, each member trading
  upon his own stock, and at his own risk, they are called regulated
  companies. When they trade upon a joint stock, each member sharing in the
  common profit or loss, in proportion to his share in this stock, they are
  called joint-stock companies. Such companies, whether regulated or
  joint-stock, sometimes have, and sometimes have not, exclusive privileges.

  Regulated companies resemble, in every respect, the corporation of trades,
  so common in the cities and towns of all the different countries of
  Europe; and are a sort of enlarged monopolies of the same kind. As no
  inhabitant of a town can exercise an incorporated trade, without first
  obtaining his freedom in the incorporation, so, in most cases, no subject
  of the state can lawfully carry on any branch of foreign trade, for which
  a regulated company is established, without first becoming a member of
  that company. The monopoly is more or less strict, according as the terms
  of admission are more or less difficult, and according as the directors of
  the company have more or less authority, or have it more or less in their
  power to manage in such a manner as to confine the greater part of the
  trade to themselves and their particular friends. In the most ancient
  regulated companies, the privileges of apprenticeship were the same as in
  other corporations, and entitled the person who had served his time to a
  member of the company, to become himself a member, either without paying
  any fine, or upon paying a much smaller one than what was exacted of other
  people. The usual corporation spirit, wherever the law does not restrain
  it, prevails in all regulated companies. When they have been allowed to
  act according to their natural genius, they have always, in order to
  confine the competition to as small a number of persons as possible,
  endeavoured to subject the trade to many burdensome regulations. When the
  law has restrained them from doing this, they have become altogether
  useless and insignificant.

  The regulated companies for foreign commerce which at present subsist in
  Great Britain, are the ancient merchant-adventurers company, now commonly
  called the Hamburgh company, the Russia company, the Eastland company, the
  Turkey company, and the African company.

  The terms of admission into the Hamburgh company are now said to be quite
  easy; and the directors either have it not in their power to subject the
  trade to any troublesome restraint or regulations, or, at least, have not
  of late exercised that power. It has not always been so. About the middle
  of the last century, the fine for admission was fifty, and at one time one
  hundred pounds, and the conduct of the company was said to be extremely
  oppressive. In 1643, in 1645, and in 1661, the clothiers and free traders
  of the west of England complained of them to parliament, as of
  monopolists, who confined the trade, and oppressed the manufactures of the
  country. Though those complaints produced no act of parliament, they had
  probably intimidated the company so far, as to oblige them to reform their
  conduct. Since that time, at least, there have been no complaints against
  them. By the 10th and 11th of William III. c.6, the fine for admission
  into the Russia company was reduced to five pounds; and by the 25th of
  Charles II. c.7, that for admission into the Eastland company to forty
  shillings; while, at the same time, Sweden, Denmark, and Norway, all the
  countries on the north side of the Baltic, were exempted from their
  exclusive charter. The conduct of those companies had probably given
  occasion to those two acts of parliament. Before that time, Sir Josiah
  Child had represented both these and the Hamburgh company as extremely
  oppressive, and imputed to their bad management the low state of the
  trade, which we at that time carried on to the countries comprehended
  within their respective charters. But though such companies may not, in
  the present times, be very oppressive, they are certainly altogether
  useless. To be merely useless, indeed, is perhaps, the highest eulogy
  which can ever justly be bestowed upon a regulated company; and all the
  three companies above mentioned seem, in their present state, to deserve
  this eulogy.

  The fine for admission into the Turkey company was formerly twenty-five
  pounds for all persons under twenty-six years of age, and fifty pounds for
  all persons above that age. Nobody but mere merchants could be admitted; a
  restriction which excluded all shop-keepers and retailers. By a bye-law,
  no British manufactures could be exported to Turkey but in the general
  ships of the company; and as those ships sailed always from the port of
  London, this restriction confined the trade to that expensive port, and
  the traders to those who lived in London and in its neighbourhood. By
  another bye-law, no person living within twenty miles of London, and not
  free of the city, could be admitted a member; another restriction which,
  joined to the foregoing, necessarily excluded all but the freemen of
  London. As the time for the loading and sailing of those general ships
  depended altogether upon the directors, they could easily fill them with
  their own goods, and those of their particular friends, to the exclusion
  of others, who, they might pretend, had made their proposals too late. In
  this state of things, therefore, this company was, in every respect, a
  strict and oppressive monopoly. Those abuses gave occasion to the act of
  the 26th of George II. c. 18, reducing the fine for admission to twenty
  pounds for all persons, without any distinction of ages, or any
  restriction, either to mere merchants, or to the freemen of London; and
  granting to all such persons the liberty of exporting, from all the ports
  of Great Britain, to any port in Turkey, all British goods, of which the
  exportation was not prohibited, upon paying both the general duties of
  customs, and the particular duties assessed for defraying the necessary
  expenses of the company; and submitting, at the same time, to the lawful
  authority of the British ambassador and consuls resident in Turkey, and to
  the bye-laws of the company duly enacted. To prevent any oppression by
  those bye-laws, it was by the same act ordained, that if any seven members
  of the company conceived themselves aggrieved by any bye-law which should
  be enacted after the passing of this act, they might appeal to the board
  of trade and plantations (to the authority of which a committee of the
  privy council has now succeeded), provided such appeal was brought within
  twelve months after the bye-law was enacted; and that, if any seven
  members conceived themselves aggrieved by any bye-law which had been
  enacted before the passing of this act, they might bring a like appeal,
  provided it was within twelve months after the day on which this act was
  to take place. The experience of one year, however, may not always be
  sufficient to discover to all the members of a great company the
  pernicious tendency of a particular bye-law; and if several of them should
  afterwards discover it, neither the board of trade, nor the committee of
  council, can afford them any redress. The object, besides, of the greater
  part of the bye-laws of all regulated companies, as well as of all other
  corporations, is not so much to oppress those who are already members, as
  to discourage others from becoming so; which may be done, not only by a
  high fine, but by many other contrivances. The constant view of such
  companies is always to raise the rate of their own profit as high as they
  can; to keep the market, both for the goods which they export, and for
  those which they import, as much understocked as they can; which can be
  done only by restraining the competition, or by discouraging new
  adventurers from entering into the trade. A fine, even of twenty pounds,
  besides, though it may not, perhaps, be sufficient to discourage any man
  from entering into the Turkey trade, with an intention to continue in it,
  may be enough to discourage a speculative merchant from hazarding a single
  adventure in it. In all trades, the regular established traders, even
  though not incorporated, naturally combine to raise profits, which are
  noway so likely to be kept, at all times, down to their proper level, as
  by the occasional competition of speculative adventurers. The Turkey
  trade, though in some measure laid open by this act of parliament, is
  still considered by many people as very far from being altogether free.
  The Turkey company contribute to maintain an ambassador and two or three
  consuls, who, like other public ministers, ought to be maintained
  altogether by the state, and the trade laid open to all his majesty’s
  subjects. The different taxes levied by the company, for this and other
  corporation purposes, might afford a revenue much more than sufficient to
  enable a state to maintain such ministers.

  Regulated companies, it was observed by Sir Josiah Child, though they had
  frequently supported public ministers, had never maintained any forts or
  garrisons in the countries to which they traded; whereas joint-stock
  companies frequently had. And, in reality, the former seem to be much more
  unfit for this sort of service than the latter. First, the directors of a
  regulated company have no particular interest in the prosperity of the
  general trade of the company, for the sake of which such forts and
  garrisons are maintained. The decay of that general trade may even
  frequently contribute to the advantage of their own private trade; as, by
  diminishing the number of their competitors, it may enable them both to
  buy cheaper, and to sell dearer. The directors of a joint-stock company,
  on the contrary, having only their share in the profits which are made
  upon the common stock committed to their management, have no private trade
  of their own, of which the interest can be separated from that of the
  general trade of the company. Their private interest is connected with the
  prosperity of the general trade of the company, and with the maintenance
  of the forts and garrisons which are necessary for its defence. They are
  more likely, therefore, to have that continual and careful attention which
  that maintenance necessarily requires. Secondly, The directors of a
  joint-stock company have always the management of a large capital, the
  joint stock of the company, a part of which they may frequently employ,
  with propriety, in building, repairing, and maintaining such necessary
  forts and garrisons. But the directors of a regulated company, having the
  management of no common capital, have no other fund to employ in this way,
  but the casual revenue arising from the admission fines, and from the
  corporation duties imposed upon the trade of the company. Though they had
  the same interest, therefore, to attend to the maintenance of such forts
  and garrisons, they can seldom have the same ability to render that
  attention effectual. The maintenance of a public minister, requiring
  scarce any attention, and but a moderate and limited expense, is a
  business much more suitable both to the temper and abilities of a
  regulated company.

  Long after the time of Sir Josiah Child, however, in 1750, a regulated
  company was established, the present company of merchants trading to
  Africa; which was expressly charged at first with the maintenance of all
  the British forts and garrisons that lie between Cape Blanc and the Cape
  of Good Hope, and afterwards with that of those only which lie between
  Cape Rouge and the Cape of Good Hope. The act which establishes this
  company (the 23rd of George II. c.51 ), seems to have had two distinct
  objects in view; first, to restrain effectually the oppressive and
  monopolizing spirit which is natural to the directors of a regulated
  company; and, secondly, to force them, as much as possible, to give an
  attention, which is not natural to them, towards the maintenance of forts
  and garrisons.

  For the first of these purposes, the fine for admission is limited to
  forty shillings. The company is prohibited from trading in their corporate
  capacity, or upon a joint stock; from borrowing money upon common seal, or
  from laying any restraints upon the trade, which may be carried on freely
  from all places, and by all persons being British subjects, and paying the
  fine. The government is in a committee of nine persons, who meet at
  London, but who are chosen annually by the freemen of the company at
  London, Bristol, and Liverpool; three from each place. No committeeman can
  be continued in office for more than three years together. Any
  committee-man might be removed by the board of trade and plantations, now
  by a committee of council, after being heard in his own defence. The
  committee are forbid to export negroes from Africa, or to import any
  African goods into Great Britain. But as they are charged with the
  maintenance of forts and garrisons, they may, for that purpose export from
  Great Britain to Africa goods and stores of different kinds. Out of the
  moneys which they shall receive from the company, they are allowed a sum,
  not exceeding eight hundred pounds, for the salaries of their clerks and
  agents at London, Bristol, and Liverpool, the house-rent of their offices
  at London, and all other expenses of management, commission, and agency,
  in England. What remains of this sum, after defraying these different
  expenses, they may divide among themselves, as compensation for their
  trouble, in what manner they think proper. By this constitution, it might
  have been expected, that the spirit of monopoly would have been
  effectually restrained, and the first of these purposes sufficiently
  answered. It would seem, however, that it had not. Though by the 4th of
  George III. c.20, the fort of Senegal, with all its dependencies, had been
  invested in the company of merchants trading to Africa, yet, in the year
  following (by the 5th of George III. c.44), not only Senegal and its
  dependencies, but the whole coast, from the port of Sallee, in South
  Barbary, to Cape Rouge, was exempted from the jurisdiction of that
  company, was vested in the crown, and the trade to it declared free to all
  his majesty’s subjects. The company had been suspected of restraining the
  trade and of establishing some sort of improper monopoly. It is not,
  however, very easy to conceive how, under the regulations of the 23d
  George II. they could do so. In the printed debates of the house of
  commons, not always the most authentic records of truth, I observe,
  however, that they have been accused of this. The members of the committee

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